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Abstract 
We combine Dillard et al.’s (2004) institutional change model with 
institutional entrepreneurship theory to analyse the introduction of a mandatory 
national accounting system in Portugal in 2010. We focus on the changes of 
legitimation criteria and accounting practices that were associated with the 
accounting standard for small and medium sized entities. Our results enhance 
understanding of the change processes involved in moving from national to 
international accounting standards. They reveal how the evolving socio-economic 
and political context, and the positioning of social actors, enabled entrepreneurial 
action by the Portuguese accounting standards setting body. Generally, institutional 
entrepreneurship was enabled by regulatory changes within the EU that 
encouraged the use of IFRS; and by the embeddedness of central actors in multiple 
fields. Implementation of the new accounting system was facilitated by actions that 
involved taking political opportunity, mobilizing important allies, and 
accommodating the interests of major protagonists. We provide expanded explanations 
of the Dillard et al. (2004) model with respect to the possibility of an earlier inversion 
of the cascading institutionalization process. Specifically, we contend that agents at the 
organizational field level counteracted the institutionalization process before it reached 
the organizational level. This explanation helps to develop better understanding of 
the role of national professional accounting associations and business 
associations in shaping criteria established at the political and economic level. At 
the organizational level, we provide insights to the reasons why some Portuguese 
accountants maintained the previous accounting system’s representational schema and 
accounting practices. 
Key words: International accounting standards; institutionalization; Dillard; 
Portugal; accounting change.  
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1. Introduction 
In 2010, the code-law based accounting system in Portugal that had been applied 
to unlisted companies was replaced by the non-code law based Sistema de 
Normalização Contabilística (Accounting Standardization System) [hereafter referred 
to as SNC]. The SNC was inspired by accounting standards issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board [IASB]. The SNC included one standard intended for 
adoption by small and medium-sized entities [SMEs]. Introduction of the SNC 
prompted important institutional changes in Portuguese accounting. These included the 
de-institutionalization of previous accounting criteria and practices that had been based 
on code-law traditions; the establishment of new legitimating criteria; and the 
embedding of new accounting practices.  
The study we report here deploys the recursive model of institutional change 
proposed by Dillard et al. (2004) to better understand the dynamics and institutional 
consequences of Portugal’s adoption of the SNC. [Hereafter, we refer to this model 
simply as the Dillard et al. model]. We combine the Dillard et al. model with 
institutional entrepreneurship theory to highlight the role of endogenous agents in 
transforming and implementing institutional change (Battilana et al., 2009; DiMaggio, 
1988; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). In particular, we aim 
to enhance understanding of how various actors collaborated to enable change and to 
promote the gradual transformation of meanings and criteria in the accounting field. We 
highlight how institutional entrepreneurship emerged within the Portuguese societal 
context, and we reveal the processes by which accounting change was implemented. We 
are motivated by the call of Battilana et al. (2009: 96) to ‘understand better how actors 
can initiate and implement change.’ 
The theoretical framework of the Dillard et al. model, when combined with 
institutional entrepreneurship theory, provides an appropriate lens for in-depth analysis 
of the change processes that occurred in Portuguese accounting. The Dillard et al. 
model has been applied in several prior studies of institutional changes affecting 
accounting (Hopper and Major, 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2006; Cruz et al., 2009) – and 
specifically in studies relating to the adoption of IFRS (Irvine, 2008; Mir and Rahaman, 
2005). Irvine (2008), for example, applied the Dillard et al. model to study the adoption 
of IFRS in the United Arab Emirates. She concluded that the adoption of IFRS in that 
country resulted from institutional pressures exerted variously by the World Bank, 
multi-national corporations, Big 4 accounting firms, and international trading partner 
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relationships. Although her study did not analyze the implementation and embedding of 
new accounting practices, it expressed concerns about the suitability of mandating a 
single regulatory regime (IFRS) in countries with distinctly different cultural, economic 
and social environments. Similarly, Mir and Rahaman (2005) used an institutional 
framework to analyze the adoption of IFRS in Bangladesh. They reported that the lack 
of a coordinated structure to promote communication among interested parties impaired 
the process of institutionalizing IFRS. 
These preceding studies, unlike the study reported here, have not explored fully 
the effects of adopting IFRS on the institutional dynamics that flow between the 
economic and political level, the accounting organizational field level, and the 
organization level (that is, of accountants). In contrast, we explore the repercussions of 
adoption for signification, legitimation and domination structures − at each of these 
three levels. 
The following paper contributes to institutional theory in three main ways. First, it 
adds to the scarce volume of literature that uses institutional theory to analyse the 
adoption of IFRS by nation states. The in-depth study we present of the implementation 
of the new IFRS-based Portuguese accounting system [SNC], highlights the difficulties 
in changing legitimating criteria and accounting practices to achieve de facto 
application of an accounting standard for SMEs. Our review of the progress of 
implementing an adapted IFRS accounting system (that is, SNC) at a national level (in 
Portugal) should be relevant to other countries that are making similar changes to their 
accounting systems (e.g. Brazil, China, Japan, Mexico, and Turkey).  
Second, by combining the Dillard et al. model with institutional entrepreneurship 
theory, we reinforce an embedded view of institutional entrepreneurs and agency. In 
particular, our analysis of the processes of change enhances knowledge of the reasons, 
ways, and means used by actors at the centre of a highly institutionalized field (and 
privileged by existing institutional arrangements) to enact divergent change in a national 
accounting system (Lockett et al., 2012; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Battilana et 
al., 2009). This novel combination extends the Dillard et al. model by fostering 
understanding of the ways and means by which reflexive, knowledgeable agents act to 
effect change.  
Third, this paper provides useful insights to the reasons why the organizational 
field is an interactive part of the societal system. In the context of accounting standard-
setting, we reveal how actions of agents at the organizational field level can counteract 
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the institutionalization process before it reaches the organization level. Further, we 
show how institutional representativeness explains why pressures can move upwards 
and downwards in the societal system.  
We have two major reasons for focusing on the accounting practices of SMEs at 
the organization level. First, SMEs have a well known dominant presence in most 
countries. There are concerns about the relevance of IFRS (or standards based on IFRS) 
for them (Alp and Ustundag, 2009). In 2009, the IASB finished a five-year development 
of a special accounting standard for SMEs. In Portugal, 99.5 per cent of companies are 
classified as SMEs (INE, 2008). Despite the prominence of this type of company in the 
global economy (they are estimated to compose 95 per cent of all companies globally),1 
the way SMEs engage with special standards developed for them has seldom been 
investigated (Alp and Ustundag, 2009; Quagli and Paoloni, 2012; Schutte and Buys, 
2011). Our present study seems timely because of its potential to facilitate 
understanding of the effect of the institutionalization processes on the adoption of the 
SNC standard for SMEs. 
Second, we are mindful that the benefits of adopting any new accounting system 
should ideally outweigh the costs. Several studies have confirmed that the advantages of 
adopting IFRS are related to size, and that there are greater levels of acceptance of IFRS 
by larger companies (e.g. Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Dumontier and Raffournier, 
1998; Francis et al., 2008). The balance between costs and benefits is an especially 
important issue for SMEs. Many SMEs feel forced to adopt a set of accounting 
standards that are oriented more to the needs of capital markets and big capital providers 
than to them (Alp and Ustundag, 2009). The IASB’s standard for SMEs is less complex, 
requires fewer disclosures, and is revised less frequently and more sparingly than IFRS. 
Nonetheless, to meet the specific needs of SMEs, it is important to know the extent to 
which the incorporation of a SME accounting standard into a new accounting system 
would suit smaller companies. 
Our empirical data are sourced from 18 interviews conducted by the first and 
second authors with actors in the Portuguese social system in the accounting field: at the 
political level, organizational field level and organization level. Where possible, the 
factual content of interview data is corroborated through triangulation with information 
drawn from archival sources.  
                                                 
1 See http://www.ifrs.org/IFRS+for+SMEs/IFRS+for+SMEs.htm, accessed on 16 August, 2012. 
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The next two sections present the theoretical framework and the institutional and 
accounting context of Portugal, respectively. The sections that then follow present 
research methods, results, discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Early formulations of institutional theory supported the view that the formal 
structure of organizations was influenced strongly by widely accepted rationalized 
myths of appropriate conduct (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). A limitation of institutional 
theory is its strong emphasis on the organizational field level. This emphasis arises from 
belief that institutional pressures exerted by competitors, the state or the professions 
operate from the organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However, to fully 
understand institutional change we must consider the links between practices at the 
organizational level and the organizational field level; the influence of higher social, 
political and economic levels on the organizational context; and the role of influential 
actors (Dillard et al., 2004). This is consistent with contention that ‘[c]hange processes 
are best examined by designs that incorporate multiple levels of analysis. Social actions 
and structures exist in a dualistic relation, constraining and empowering the other’ 
(Scott, 2001: 203). 
The Dillard et al. (2004) framework draws on institutional theory, Weberian 
notions of social context (Weber, 1968), and a dynamic structuration of social systems 
that incorporates change into the institutionalization process (Giddens 1976, 1979, 
1984). This framework regards institutionalization to be a process that recognizes the 
political nature of institutional change, and incorporates the relative power of organized 
interests. The Dillard et al. model represents a continual and dynamic process of 
institutionalization that proceeds in a recursive cascade through three levels of the social 
environment – economic and political level, organizational field level, and 
organizational level. The higher level represents the societal level, where political and 
economic systems establish general, taken-for-granted norms or criteria (CPE) that are 
disseminated in society and in the organizational field. The prevailing systems of 
society and powerful coalitions influence the enactment of these norms, criteria and 
practices. At the organizational field level, the norms, criteria and practices established 
at the economic and political level (CPE) are translated into legitimacy criteria (COF) to 
evaluate whether action in the organizational field is legitimate. The COF are translated 
into operating practices (POF) to provide the legitimating and regulating base for action 
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at the organizational level. The organizational field includes industry groups and 
professional and trade associations.  
At the organizational level, organizations can be innovators if they develop new 
practices within the parameters set by practices (POF) adopted at the organizational field 
level. They can be late adopters if they adopt the practices of innovators, even if only 
ceremonially. Innovative practices can move laterally or vertically. They can modify 
legitimate practices and criteria in the organizational field by reinforcing, revising or 
eliminating them. New practices (P’OF) (perceived as ‘better practices’) are adopted by 
other organizations within the same organizational field. They become expected (or 
institutionalized) practices. The new legitimate practices (P’OF) and criteria (C’OF) at the 
organizational field level influence the broader macro-level economic and political 
environment. Hence, they affect symbolic sense-making criteria (C’PE) by reinforcing, 
modifying or eliminating existing norms and practices. 
In the Dillard et al. framework, the theoretical context of the institutionalization 
process incorporates structuration theory. Giddens (1976, 1979, 1984) argues that 
institutionalized features of social systems have structural properties; and that social 
forces stabilize relationships across time and space. Accordingly, structure is conceived 
to be rules and resources that are implicated recursively in social reproduction. 
Specifically, Giddens contends there are three kinds of structure in a social system. The 
first type of structure is signification or symbolic representation. This helps to ascribe 
meaning to social behavior through organized webs of language (such as semantic 
codes, interpretive schemes and discursive practices) consciously, subconsciously, or 
unconsciously. The second type of structure is legitimation. This consists of norms, 
values, laws and regulations that provide meaning and legitimating criteria to evaluate 
organizational actions. The third type of structure is domination. This is associated with 
the production of power that arises from the control of human and material resources.2  
Changes in these three types of social structure are the consequence of reflexive, 
knowledgeable human action – something which is enabled and simultaneously 
constrained by the existing structures. According to Dillard et al. (2004: 521) 
“[i]nstitutions can be seen as manifestations of mutually reinforcing signification 
(representations) and legitimating structures (values and norms)… reflected and 
sustained over time by the allocation and accumulation of resources associated with 
                                                 
2 Signification, legitimation and dominations structures coincide with key features of Weber’s axes of 
tension – representation, rationalization and power (Dillard et al., 2004). 
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their enactment by agents.’ Recursive interaction between rules and resources supports 
and mutually reinforces the implementation and embedding of institutional practices. 
The loss of either rules or resources is conducive to de-institutionalization, such that 
eventually symbolic representations or values without resource allocation are discarded. 
The institutionalization process allocates resources based on accepted rules, and 
this then reinforces extant structures. This process involves inverting the cascade as the 
innovative practices taken by knowledgeable, reflexive agents within organizations, rise 
through the three levels. Accordingly, the Dillard et al. model represents a recursive 
process in which changes can move upwards and downwards in response to taken-for-
granted norms, criteria, values and beliefs (that are revised continually at all levels).  
For Dillard et al. (2004: 535) ‘the duality of structure is the fundamental change 
process.’ Action by human agents is the primary mechanism for changing structural 
elements (signification, legitimation and domination) in each of the three levels of 
social systems. Thus, the further understanding we provide of why and how actors are 
more likely to identify and respond to opportunities to enact institutional change will 
contribute to the development of a more comprehensive appreciation of the Dillard et al. 
model. This will be facilitated by the integration of insights from institutional 
entrepreneurship theory into assessment of the model. Both the Dillard et al. model and 
institutional entrepreneurship theory attend to interests and agency. However, 
institutional entrepreneurship extends the scope of analysis in three ways: to include the 
characterization of actors who assume the role of institutional entrepreneurs; to identify 
the field conditions that create opportunities for change; and to explain the role of 
interpretative struggles and intervention strategies in changing a field (Hardy and 
Maguire, 2008). The institutional entrepreneurship branch of institutional theory 
explores endogenous explanations of institutional change − something which is 
particularly useful in extending the explanatory power of the Dillard et al. model. Thus, 
the integration we make helps to reveal how change can be enacted and initiated by 
human action, whilst still proceeding in a recursive cascade within the societal context. 
Institutional entrepreneurs have been defined as organized actors who have 
interests in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create 
new institutions or transform existing ones (DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire et al., 2004). 
Institutional entrepreneurship requires actors to replace existing practices with new 
ones, and to then ensure that these practices are adopted widely and taken-for-granted 
by other actors in a field (Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Battilana et al. (2009) refined this 
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definition by specifying two conditions that actors must fulfill to be regarded as 
institutional entrepreneurs: first, they must initiate divergent changes that break with 
institutionalized templates and institutional logics within a given context; and second, 
they must mobilize resources to implement these changes.  
According to Hardy and Maguire (2008), institutional entrepreneurship literature 
promotes two primordial approaches to understand how institutional change 
commences. The first approach focuses on the way in which fields create a limited 
number of subject positions or social positions that enable actors to be institutional 
entrepreneurs. The second approach focuses explicitly on the special characteristics, 
qualities and abilities that distinguish institutional entrepreneurs from others in a field 
(Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Consistently, Battilana et al. (2009) developed a model of 
the process of institutional entrepreneurship that specifies the enabling conditions for 
institutional entrepreneurship, and the process of implementing divergent change. They 
identified two types of enabling conditions. First, are the field-level conditions, such as 
the degree of heterogeneity and institutionalization of the organizational field; and the 
jolts, crises or regulatory changes that disturb the field-level consensus. Second, are the 
actors’ social positions − something that affects their perception of a field and their 
access to resources. Implementation of divergent change implicates three activities: 
developing a shared vision of the need for change; mobilizing people to support and 
accept new routines; and motivating others to achieve and sustain change.  
A limitation of the Dillard et al. model is that it conceptualizes innovators versus 
late adopters at the organizational field level based on a unitary view of organizations. 
Hooper and Major (2007) proposed a different approach to diffusion processes at the 
organizational level. They replaced the two-stage process (innovators versus late 
adopters) by a process in which organizational field practices (POF) were translated into 
working practices (P), and were enacted subsequently, at the intra-organizational level. 
This translation assumes that ideas and practices are interpreted and reformulated during 
the process of adoption (Greenwood et al., 2008). Accordingly, if organizational actors 
experience institutional contradictions during this enactment (such as inconsistencies 
among, and within, established social arrangements), the consciousness of actors is 
reshaped; and resistance to imposed institutionalized practices should be expected. This 
conceptualization is informed by Seo and Creed’s (2002) four sources of institutional 
contradictions: 
9 
 
1) inefficiency produced by conforming to institutional arrangements that conflict 
with technical activities, notwithstanding the possibility of loose coupling;  
2) poor adaptation to external environments because institutional arrangements 
make organizations less adaptable over the long run, given psychological resistance to 
change and economic interdependencies;  
3) multiple and contradictory interconnected institutional arrangements and 
prescriptions organizations cannot totally conform with; and  
4) misalignment between social arrangements, such as those that are likely to 
reflect the ideas and goals of more powerful constituents and the interests of diverse 
actors who enact, inhabit and reproduce those social arrangements.  
These contradictions prompt change in the collective consciousness (or praxis) of 
actors. They provide alternative logics of action and resources that are used in the 
process of institutional change. 
 
3. The Portuguese accounting system and institutional setting 
In Portugal, 99.5 per cent of all firms are SMEs and 97.8 per cent are small and/or 
micro companies.3 SMEs employ about three quarters of the active population and are 
responsible for 60 per cent of national turnover. Almost all Portuguese SMEs trade in 
Portugal exclusively ─ only about 10 per cent export their products (INE, 2008). 
Financial institutions are the main providers of capital for SMEs. In part, this is because 
the low importance of capital markets in the Portuguese financial system (Ferreira et al., 
2007). In September 2010, only 52 companies were listed on the Portuguese Stock 
Exchange (Euronext, 2010). Because Portuguese tax authorities and banks are the main 
users of accounting information, and because there is a small stock market, the low level 
of concern in Portugal for investors’ needs is unsurprising. There is greater concern in 
Portugal with issues of tax determination and creditor protection. This leads to more 
prudent and conservative accounting (Ferreira et al., 2007; Ferreira, 1998).  
Before the SNC was adopted, the Portuguese accounting system was classified in 
the Continental cluster of code-law based countries in which accounting was regulated 
in detail (Mueller et al., 1997; Nobes and Parker, 2004). European countries classified 
similarly include Belgium, France, Greece and Spain. The Portuguese accounting 
                                                 
3 Portuguese Decree-law 372/2007 (6 November) and the European Union’s Recommendation 
2003/361/CE define SMEs to be companies that fall within one of the three following limits: total assets 
less than €43 million; total sales and other income less than €50 million; or number of employees less 
than 250. Small companies have less than €10 million of total assets or total income, and 50 employees; 
and micro companies have less than €2 million of total assets or total income, and 10 employees. 
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system’s formative structure is based on the Roman Code. As such, accounting and 
financial reporting rules are specified and prescribed in law, and are detailed in an 
Accounting Plan (Ferreira, 1998). Regulation has been developed by way of mercantile 
legislation (Commercial Code and Companies Law); tax legislation (Tax Code and tax 
regulations); and accounting legislation (Official Accounting Plan and Accounting 
Standards).  
The first Portuguese Official Accounting Plan (Plano Oficial de Contabilidade - 
POC) was established in 1977 (Decree-law 47/77) ─ the year the Portuguese accounting 
standards setter, the Comissão de Normalização Contabilística (CNC - Accounting 
Standards Board), was established. The CNC comprised a president, a general council, 
and an executive committee. Members were drawn from the accounting profession, 
audit profession, users of financial statements (including government departments), and 
higher education institutions. The Portuguese model of accounting regulation was 
inspired by the French model. Thus, the standard-setting body, the CNC (which was 
attached administratively and financially to the Ministry of Finance) was empowered to 
develop accounting standards that were issued as decrees or decree-laws by the 
Portuguese Government (Ferreira, 1998). As a consequence, pronouncements by the 
accounting profession had no formal status. The only source of financial accounting 
standards was the written law.  
Since 1986, the Portuguese accounting system has had to comply with accounting 
directives of the EU. Additionally, to deal with the insufficiencies of the POC in 
addressing international financial and accounting developments, the CNC issued several 
accounting standards inspired by IFRS. As these IFRS-inspired standards came into 
force, French influence began to wane (Ferreira, 1998). However, de facto 
harmonization did not occur fully, for several reasons. First, legally the POC was 
required to prevail over these standards. This encouraged Portuguese accountants to 
continue to use the POC. Second, only a small number of IAS was adopted; and third, 
most of these IFRS-inspired standards were only one or two pages long. Fontes et al. 
(2005) concluded that in 2002 Portuguese standards exhibited a 50% similarity in terms 
of accounting treatments and strength of accounting methods with IFRS. The level of 
disclosure in POC standards was also very low. Thus, Portuguese accounting practices 
remained oriented towards legal compliance. 
Historically, the profession of accountant in Portugal has been separated from the 
profession of auditor. Two distinct bodies officially represent Portuguese accountants 
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and Portuguese auditors, despite the possible overlap in membership. The practice of 
accounting, and the right to use the title of official accountant, is restricted to the 
members of the Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas (OTOC - Order of Official 
Accountants). OTOC members contract with their clients to maintain accounting 
records and prepare financial statements. By law, the annual accounts and tax returns of 
all companies must be signed by an accountant. OTOC is under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Finance.  
The auditing profession consists of official auditors who are registered in the 
Ordem dos Revisores Oficiais de Contas (OROC - Order of Official Auditors). This 
officially recognized body is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. The 
obligation to be audited is compulsory for joint stock companies, limited companies that 
exceed specified size limits,4 financial institutions and insurance companies. OROC and 
OTOC are represented on the CNC, thereby allowing their participation in the 
development of accounting standards. 
The SNC came into force through Decree-law 158/2009 (13 July), with 
mandatory effect from 1 January, 2010. Listed companies are required to apply IFRS in 
individual accounts and in consolidated financial statements. Unlisted companies which 
prepare consolidated financial statements can opt to adopt IFRS in legally audited 
consolidated and individual accounts for a minimum period of three years. Unlisted 
companies not preparing consolidated financial statements are required to apply the set 
of 28 SNC standards, Normas Contabilísticas de Relato Financeiro (NCRF - Financial 
Reporting Accounting Standards). These are similar to IFRS.5 Companies under the 
particular limits established by the government can apply a single standard, Norma 
Contabilística de Relato Financeiro – Pequenas Empresas (NCRF-PE - Financial 
Reporting Accounting Standard – Small Entities), based on the IASB’s accounting 
standard for SMEs. Nonetheless, if financial statements of the latter group of companies 
are audited legally, the set of 28 standards is to be applied. At each level, if an issue is 
not addressed, it is possible to use the accounting treatment in the more complete 
system - that is, if companies use the NCRF-PE and the accounting treatment for a 
                                                 
4 Total assets €1,500,000; total sales and other income €3,000,000; and number of employees 50. 
 
5 There are two exceptions. The accounting standard for financial instruments was simplified 
considerably (such that companies can use IASB standards when the SNC standard on financial 
instruments does not regulate a particular subject). Another exception is the financial accounting 
reporting standard 26 “Environmental Matters” (based on a European Commission recommendation dated  
30 May, 2001). 
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specific accounting problem is not regulated by it, it can use the 28 standards. As well, 
if companies use the 28 standards, they can use IAS/IFRS, in omission cases. 
The final version of the SNC contains a conceptual framework, 28 accounting 
standards (NCRF), two interpretative standards, and a specific accounting standard for 
SMEs (NCRF-PE). All standards are similar to the EU translations of endorsed 
standards issued by the IASB. The SNC also contains model financial statements and a 
chart of accounts. The new SNC accounting model differs from the POC in several 
significant ways:  
1) It has a conceptual framework that sets the theoretical concepts underlying all 
accounting standards. The previous accounting system based on the POC did not have a 
conceptual framework. 
2) It organizes subjects by individual accounting standards. In contrast, the POC 
was structured according to such matters as technical considerations, characteristics of 
financial information, accounting principles, measurement criteria and type of financial 
statements. 
3) It has a specific accounting language, similar to IFRS. This led several new 
words to be introduced to the Portuguese accounting lexicon (e.g., recognition, 
derecognition, measurement, impairment).  
4) It has new accounting concepts and measurement criteria (e.g. cash generating 
unit, recoverable amount, value in use, biological assets). 
5) It increased the level of disclosure substantially. 
Adoption of the SNC also changed regulations governing the functioning of the 
CNC and OTOC. The CNC became smaller. OTOC was elevated in status to Order6 of 
Official Accountants. 
 
4. Research method 
A qualitative research approach involving semi-structured interviews was used to 
acquire an in-depth understanding of the events leading to adoption of the SNC. This 
method is appropriate if, as here, the purpose is to develop a detailed and well-rounded 
understanding of a social process, social change, social organization or social meaning 
(Mason, 2002; Saunders et al., 2003). The interviews were conducted in Portuguese (the 
native language of all interviewees and interviewers). They were taped-recorded. 
                                                 
6 OTOC was previously known as Câmara dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas (CTOC - Chamber of Official 
Accountants) before the publication of the law establishing the SNC in 2009. “Order” is the highest social 
status of a profession in Portugal. 
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Interviews were transcribed in Portuguese to avoid the possibility that idiomatic terms 
and particular meanings might be distorted. Interview transcripts were sent to 
respondents for them to correct any errors and misinterpretations. This procedure also 
provided interviewees with the opportunity to volunteer additional information and to 
summarize information. The process reinforced the accuracy of interview data. 
Translation of interview transcripts into English occurred after the interviewees had 
confirmed correctness.  
Interviews were conducted at different points in time since the new accounting 
standards were prepared by the CNC in 2007 but were not applied by accountants until 
2010. To elicit information at the political and economic level, two interviews were 
conducted with several members of the CNC. The first interview, in June 2008, was 
with the President of the CNC (interviewee A) and two other members of the Executive 
Commission (interviewees B and C). The second interview, in August 2008, was with 
the President of the Executive Commission responsible for coordinating the workgroups 
that developed the new accounting standards (interviewee D) and interviewee B (who 
also participated in the first interview). The specific purpose of these interviews was to 
determine the main reasons for developing the SNC; to understand how the 
signification, legitimation and domination structures enabled and constrained actions of 
the CNC; and to identify the main institutional entrepreneurs who influenced the 
progress (and final content) of the SNC. 
In July 2008, the representative of the CNC on the Accounting Regulatory 
Committee (ARC) of the European Commission (interviewee E) was interviewed. The 
ARC provides opinions on European Commission proposals to adopt (endorse) IFRS. It 
is composed of representatives from all member-states. The main purpose of the 
interview was to assess the degree of political influence on the functioning of the CNC 
and to evaluate how the SNC reflected changes in legitimation, signification and 
domination structures in the EU in previous years. 
At the organizational field level, we interviewed the President of OTOC 
(interviewee F) in March 2011. Our objectives were to elicit understanding of the role 
of OTOC in establishing new operating practices that would provide the legitimating 
base for actions at the level of accountants; the implications of the SNC for the 
accounting profession; knowledge of how the legitimation and signification structures 
evolved due to the adoption of the SNC; and knowledge of how OTOC influenced the 
development of the SNC. In late 2012 and early 2013, we interviewed the President of 
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the Order of Official Auditors (interviewee G), the representatives on the CNC of the 
Portuguese Confederation of Commerce and Services (interviewee H), Confederation of 
the Portuguese Farmers (interviewee I), and Portuguese Confederation of 
Manufacturing (interviewee J), to clarify the influences exerted by the organizational 
field level on the political and economic level.  
At the organizational level, interviews were conducted in March and April 2010 
with four accountants who had SMEs as clients (interviewees K, L, M, N); and in 
December 2012 with another four accountants (interviewees O, P, Q, R). The purpose 
was to understand how accountants prepared to adopt the SNC; the implications of the 
new system for their legitimating and signification structures; the influence of 
isomorphic pressures in institutionalizing the new accounting practices; and to reveal 
how the SNC was being applied by accountants. The interviewees differed in terms of 
age, client turnover, main activity of clients, and whether or not they worked in 
professions other than accounting. Table 1 provides profiles of all interviewees. 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
To address issues of data reliability and data validity we followed the 
methodological approach to interview conceptualization and operationalization 
proposed by Mason (2002), Quivy and Campenhoudt (2005) and Saunders et al. (2003). 
Information about the context of the interviewees’ organizations was gathered in 
advance of interviews to enhance credibility and gain the confidence of interviewees. A 
list of interview topics was provided to participants in advance. This promoted validity 
and reliability by enabling interviewees to prepare the information being requested. 
During the interviews a neutral tone of voice was used. Long questions and theoretical 
concepts were avoided. The interviewees were given time to develop their responses. 
Whenever necessary, answers were read back to interviewees in summary form to test 
for correct understanding. A conscious effort was made not to allow the personal 
perspective of the interviewer to influence the responses of interviewees. To enhance 
data sensitivity, interview data were coded by the researchers using a coding scheme 
developed during the reading of the transcripts. A conceptual matrix was prepared to 
help summarize the main themes discussed by the interviewees.  
In addition to data collected from interviews, other information was gathered from 
several other formal sources associated with the process of developing and 
implementing the SNC. Data were triangulated with proposals of political parties in the 
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Portuguese Parliament (CDS-Partido Popular, 2010; Partido Comunista Português, 
2009), minutes of ARC meetings,7 press releases (Ministry of Finance, 2005), 
government speeches (Minister of Finance, 2008; Secretary of State for Fiscal Affairs, 
2008), official documents of the CNC (CNC, 2003; 2007) and official documents of the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2006; 2012). Relationships between 
themes raised in the interviews were established through re-reading data and matching 
those data with documentary information collected. The interviews and the documents 
were coded according to the themes being analysed. 
 
5. Results 
Our results highlight the evolution of three dimensions of contextual change 
(signification, legitimation, and domination) for each of the three levels of social 
context suggested by Dillard et al. (2004). They aid understanding of the relational 
dynamics flowing from the economic and political level (Section 5.1), to the 
organizational field level (Section 5.2), and to the organizational level (Section 5.3). At 
the political and economic level we identify the actors who can be regarded as 
institutional entrepreneurs: that is, who initiated divergent changes and who mobilized 
resources to implement these changes. 
 
5.1 Economic and political level: Changes in signification, legitimation and 
domination structures 
Analysis of the evolution of legitimation, signification and domination structures 
in the organizational field of accounting reveals that the rationale for accounting has 
changed during the past century. The development of stock exchanges, evolving 
patterns of investments, and increased scrutiny of financial statements in the second half 
of the 20th century, are some events that have connected accounting and economic 
decision-making (see Young, 2006). The financial statement user has been conceived 
commonly as a rational economic decision-maker who required value-relevant 
information, a reduced incidence of earnings management, and timely loss recognition 
adjustments (Barth et al., 2008). Additionally, in the period following the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-1998 financial capital was encouraged to assume a dominant 
position within world capitalism. Policies of financialization of national economies 
became common. Underlying neo-liberal models, based on the elimination of capital 
                                                 
7 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/committees/arc_meetings_en.htm, accessed 
on 1 April, 2011. 
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controls and the standardization of world financial markets, boosted a so-called ‘new 
international financial architecture’ (Arnold, 2012). This response to the East Asian 
crisis, led by the United States, promoted the spread of an Anglo-American style of 
capitalism based upon a weak financial governance regime, less-than-complete 
transparency, international financial standards, and market self-discipline. In this 
environment, IASB standards were enforced as a remedy for financial instability and as 
a pathway to economic development (Arnold, 2012).  
Nonetheless, the collapse of Enron in 2001, and other major international 
accounting scandals in this period, raised doubts about the stability of accounting 
standards. These doubts were resolved partially through the shift from highly detailed 
rules-based United States accounting standards to more general principles-based 
accounting standards (Bhimani, 2008). The accounting representation schema evolved 
towards utility of financial information and to a principles-based approach. This 
allowed IASB standards to become an increasingly influential system of representation 
or signification − as more people accepted IASB standards as common knowledge and 
as the normal basis for doing accounting (Rodrigues and Craig, 2007). Thus, the IASB 
acquired a ‘soft’ form of  power that enabled it to enforce a dominant logic (Suddaby et 
al., 2007) that was supported by neo-liberal ideologies. This social, political and 
economic context within which the international accounting harmonization process 
evolved, defined structural boundaries for action in the accounting arena within the EU, 
member-states, professional associations, and individual organizations. 
In 1995, the Commission of the European Communities report titled ‘Accounting 
harmonization: a new strategy vis-à-vis international harmonization’ (European 
Commission, 1995) acknowledged the inadequacy of European accounting directives in 
effecting accounting harmonization. It expressed also support for IASB standards. 
Thereafter, the EU increased funding of IASB activities. This reinforced the adequacy 
and importance of IASB standards within the EU. The resources allocated by the EU to 
IFRS also reinforced the signification structures associated with IASB standards within 
the EU (Dillard et al., 2004). These new signification structures validated the 
assumption that financial information which accorded with globally accepted 
accounting standards was superior and legitimate (Rodrigues and Craig, 2007).  
Interviewee E (the SNC representative on the ARC) advised that: 
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Over the past years the funding of the IASB has been widely discussed in 
meetings of the ARC. The EU has paid substantial amounts to the IASB, due 
to the adoption of IFRS by member-states.  
 
The minutes of ARC meetings show that resource allocation to new structures prompted 
by IASB standards was, and still is, an important matter for the European Commission. 
Several ARC meetings included as a point of discussion: ‘IASB Governance, European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group enhancement and funding.’8  
Changes in signification structures were followed by a change of norms and 
values: that is, of legitimation structures in the EU. European accounting directives 
were modified to accord with IASB standards. In 2002, the European Commission’s 
Regulation 1606/2002 required all EU-domiciled companies listed on stock exchanges 
within the EU to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accord with IFRS by 
2005. This provided new legitimating grounds for action by member-states (CPE). In 
turn, this dynamic flowed to accounting regulations issued for unlisted companies by 
those member-states who had changed their national accounting system by adopting 
IFRS (or adapted IFRS). The change helped them to ameliorate the ensuing lack of 
comparability of financial information among national companies (listed versus unlisted 
companies). These regulatory changes enabled new concepts and ideas to be introduced 
in national accounting systems in accord with the new signification and legitimation 
structures in the EU. 
In Portugal, political criteria were translated into a new accounting system by the 
CNC. This occurred at the political and economic level rather than at the organizational 
field level.9 Creation of the new accounting system began in 2002. In 2003, the CNC 
website published a projected accounting model (representing the probable future of the 
Portuguese accounting system) (CNC, 2003). The structure was similar to that of the 
SNC. Interviewee A noted that: 
 
                                                 
8 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/committees/arc_meetings_en.htm, accessed on 1 
April, 2011.  
 
9 Even though the new criteria in the accounting field (the SNC) were established at the political and 
economic level, new operating practices (POF) had to occur at the organizational field level (as a result of 
the training provided by professional accounting associations). 
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In 2003, the CNC considered the adoption of international accounting 
standards because the POC was becoming insufficient and several other 
European countries (such as Spain) were changing their national accounting 
laws to align with IFRS.  
 
Interviewee B observed that: 
 
After Regulation 1606/2002, the decision to move forward to IFRS was 
consensual among members of the CNC, even though the existing differences 
between the POC and IASB standards demanded significant preparation 
efforts by Portuguese accountants. It did not make any sense to have 
significantly different accounting systems applied by listed and unlisted 
companies. 
 
According to interviewee J, the need for the Portuguese accounting system to 
evolve was highlighted by Regulation 1606/2002, the modernization of the European 
Accounting Directives, and the desire to reduce administrative costs. 
Problems identified in an institutional field stimulate institutional change and 
entrepreneurial actions (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Hardy and Maguire, 2008; Seo 
and Creed, 2002). Thus, prompted by Regulation 1606/2002, the CNC presented the 
SNC as a new institutional arrangement that would help reduce problems of financial 
statement comparability.  
The composition of the CNC’s Executive Committee (the main body responsible 
for developing regulatory changes to the Portuguese accounting system) reveals how its 
members were exposed to IFRS logic. The principal profession of eight of the thirteen 
members (62%) was ‘Official auditor’. Interviewee E noted that: 
 
Several members of the executive committee have worked in multinational 
companies that report in accordance with IFRS. Others are official auditors of 
multinational companies, and of listed companies. One member represents the 
Portuguese stock exchange regulator (Comissão do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários [CMVM]). All these members are very familiar with IFRS and 
have supported their adoption. 
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These members had been exposed to alternative practices and this helped to enable the 
entrepreneurial action of the CNC. IFRS were already part of their grounds for 
signification and legitimation because of the acceptance of IFRS by multinational 
companies, the audit profession and stock markets. Interviewee B observed that: 
 
Members of OROC have always appreciated IASB standards. OROC is very 
supportive of IFRS. Even if it was his personal opinion, the President of 
OROC mentioned several times publicly that IFRS should be adopted by all 
types of companies. 
 
Interviewee G (the President of OROC) affirmed this view: 
 
The adoption of the SNC was very important for the audit profession. The 
POC was obsolete and had several gaps. We also felt that our opinion 
regarding the development of the SNC was supported at the CNC through the 
presence of several official auditors on the main bodies of the CNC, including 
the future president of the CNC. He was a member of the Superior Council of 
OROC. 
 
Change processes depend on the opportunity to access the political system and 
political allies (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007;  Rao and Giorgi, 2006). Additionally, 
some actors have positions that accord them legitimacy with respect to diverse 
stakeholders. These actors do not possess power. Instead, they occupy positions 
allowing them to exercise power over the field (Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Given the 
code-law features of the Portuguese accounting system, the support of the Portuguese 
Government was essential for the SNC to proceed. In 2005, the CNC project was 
strengthened by the appointment of a Minister of Finance who had been President of the 
Directing Board of the CMVM for five years before joining the Government in July, 
2005. He had also been a former President of the Executive Commission (and the 
Regional European Committee) of the International Organization of Securities 
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Commissions (IOSCO) for four years, and President of a group of experts of the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators. 
According to interviewee E, ‘claims of listed companies about the costs of 
maintaining a dual accounting system were an important factor in the decision to 
proceed with the SNC by the Ministry of Finance.’ Indeed, the Minister of Finance 
played a significant role in developing and implementing the SNC. In December 2005, 
he met the Council of the CMVM. The Minister’s embeddedness in the stock exchange 
field led him to support the interests of listed companies. After this meeting, a Ministry 
of Finance press release announced that it would study ‘the possibility of the exclusive 
use of IFRS … to avoid the necessity of keeping two sets of accounts by listed 
companies … [and that it would create] a working group to adapt the company income 
tax code so that IFRS could be used by all companies’ (Ministry of Finance, 2005: 1).  
In 2006, the CNC began developing the SNC in its final form. However, the 
Portuguese Government exercised influence on the SNC’s content by forcing the 
introduction of a specific standard for SMEs. This was something that was not 
envisaged in the initial SNC project (CNC, 2003). In early 2006, the CNC met with the 
Secretary of State for Fiscal Affairs to present the structure of the new accounting 
system. Interviewee D explained that at this meeting ‘The Secretary gave explicit 
instructions to incorporate, in the new accounting model, a specific accounting standard 
for SMEs.’ 
 Interviewee G explained that the NCRF-PE was suggested by the Portuguese 
Government because the political context of the EU was encouraging reductions in 
administrative costs. In 2006, a European Commission working document referred to 
‘unnecessary and disproportionate administrative costs severely hamper[ing] economic 
activity’; and it drew attention to the Commission’s commitment ‘to reducing these 
unnecessary burdens to the maximum extent possible’ (European Commission, 2006: 
2).10 According to interviewee G, ‘The NCRF-PE had to be created so that the SNC 
could be implemented. The SNC and the NCRF-PE are a combined product.’ 
Interviewees H and J corroborated this assessment. 
The representative of the CNC on the ARC (interviewee E) confirmed that from 
2006, the development of the new accounting system was monitored closely by the 
Secretary of State for Fiscal Affairs. In the context of the SNC, political influence was 
                                                 
10 In 2012, the European Parliament and Council issued Directive 2012/6/EU (amending Council 
Directive 78/660/EEC) regarding the annual accounts of certain types of companies, with respect to 
micro-entities. 
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evident also in the establishment of quantitative boundaries. These distinguished 
companies that were required to use all standards from those who were required to use 
only the SME standard.  
In 2007, the CNC announced the SNC publicly. In the official document that 
presented the SNC project (CNC, 2007), the CNC sought to ‘[c]raft a vision for 
divergent change’ (Battilana et al., 2009: 79). Rationales for institutional change by the 
CNC were constructed by explaining the international accounting harmonization 
process, the insufficiencies and disadvantages of the existing accounting system, and 
how the existing system had failed to accommodate the interests of all companies.11 The 
theorization of the SNC continued in April 2008, when the CNC began the ‘due 
process’ phase for approval of the SNC. The CNC presented the new accounting system 
for public evaluation in a public ceremony attended by the Minister of Finance and the 
Secretary of State for Fiscal Affairs. Both made speeches emphasizing the problems of 
the old system and the advantages of the SNC. The Minister of Finance (2008: 2) noted 
that the SNC model ‘will be an additional vehicle to modernize our economy because 
our companies and economic agents will be better able to integrate into the new 
economic world context.’ The Secretary of State for Fiscal Affairs (2008: 5) reinforced 
this by asserting that ‘the new accounting strategy is appropriate in the actual context of 
internationalization, trade liberation and economic globalization … the SNC is itself a 
source of competitiveness…’.  
To avoid criticism that the SNC favored listed companies by imposing an 
accounting model that was inappropriate for the majority of Portuguese companies, the 
ministerial discourse also sought to resonate with the interests and needs of SMEs. The 
Minister of Finance (2008: 6) acknowledged the different characteristics of Portuguese 
companies. He stated that ‘the SNC took into account their different financial 
information needs. These range from entities with listed securities, with increased 
demands, to micro-entities that only need a simplified system.’ The Secretary of State 
for Fiscal Affairs (2008: 7) repeated this statement word-for-word in his speech, as well. 
This theorization process invoked the inefficiency of the POC and claimed advantages 
of the SNC to develop the perception that there were benefits for all actors in the 
accounting field, and to encourage actors to participate in the change process 
(Greenwood et al., 2002). 
                                                 
11 The CNC considered the POC needed technical revision to incorporate a conceptual framework, and 
recognition and measurement criteria. The POC had been in force for 25 years and no longer responded 
well to contemporary requirements. 
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However, the inclusion of the NCRF-PE in the SNC was not unanimous among 
members of the CNC. Interviews revealed that both OROC and the Confederation of 
Commerce and Services were against the inclusion of this standard because its 
simplicity risked limiting the SNC’s effects. However, the Confederation of Farmers 
and the Confederation of Manufacturing interviewees agreed with this standard. 
According to interviewee I: ‘Most agricultural businesses are small… so we have tried 
to make the CNC aware of the need for the NCRF-PE.’ The representative of the 
Confederation of Manufacturing (interviewee J) acknowledged that the SME standard 
was important for the manufacturing sector due to the small size of many companies in 
that sector. 
Since the SNC came into effect in January 2010, the limits under which 
companies are allowed to use the NCRF-PE have changed. Initially, decree-law 
158/2009 (13 July) established that NCRF-PE could be used by companies that fell 
within two of the three following limits: total assets €500,000; total sales and other 
income €1,000,000; and number of employees 20. However, in December 2009 the 
Portuguese Communist Party submitted a proposal to amend this law by increasing 
these limits to €1,500,000/ €3,000,000/50 respectively. The proposal explained that the 
limits of €1,500,000/€3,000,000/50 used in the Companies Law ‘in practice, separates 
small companies from large companies’ (Partido Comunista Português, 2009: 3). These 
limits are accepted widely in the Portuguese accounting field. This proposal was 
approved by Decree-Law 20/2010 (23 August), thereby allowing many more companies 
to use the NCRF-PE.12  
Representatives of sector confederations (interviewees H, I and J) concurred with 
the changed limits, despite the fact they did not influence this change. The Presidents of 
OTOC (interviewee F) and OROC (interviewee G) revealed that they played an active 
role, in effected as institutional entrepreneurs, in changing the limits. OTOC sought to 
increase the number of companies required to use the NCRF-PE only, by increasing the 
limits. However, due to OROC’s influence, the limits were increased only up to the 
point at which they triggered the legal requirement for official auditing. The President 
of OROC (interviewee G) explained his rationale as follows: 
 
This was a particular aspect about which OROC pressured the Government. It 
would be very complex for official auditors to use two sets of standards (the 
                                                 
12 See http://debates.parlamento.pt/page.aspx?cid=r3.dar, accessed on 1 March, 2011. 
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NCRF-PE and the 28 standards). As the new limits matched the limits of 
official audit, we had important productivity gains. This was because we only 
have to deal with the 28 standards [and not the NCRF-PE standard as well]. 
 
With respect to the domination perspective, it is important to recognize that the 
EU controls the allocation of significant funds to member-states. Thus, Portuguese 
Government decisions are constrained by choices taken by the EU. In turn, the CNC is 
resource-dependent on the Portuguese Government. This chain of power and 
domination reinforced the development of new legitimation and signification structures 
at a national level, consistent with CPE and the recursive aspect of the 
institutionalization process suggested by Dillard et al. (2004). 
  
5.2 Organizational field level: Changes in signification, legitimation and 
domination structures 
Generally, large Portuguese companies have their own accounting department or 
individual accountant. Usually, smaller companies are managed by owners and engage 
an external accountant. Because SMEs comprise the majority of companies in Portugal, 
most of the 31,000 official accountants registered to practice by OTOC have SMEs as 
clients. The President of OTOC (interviewee F) affirmed this, and the role of 
accountants, with respect to SMEs: 
 
SMEs are the main business for accountants. SMEs do not have a structure to 
support management. Therefore, accountants should have a close relationship 
with business owners, based on trust and partnership. Accountants should be 
multifaceted and support business decisions of managers with useful 
information. To do so, they need a great knowledge of the business, its needs 
and growth perspectives. 
 
Interviewee F disclosed that the Secretary of State for Fiscal Affairs had contacted 
him in 2008, when he was President of CTOC (OTOC’s predecessor body until 2009) to 
ascertain CTOC’s position regarding the SNC. Interviewee F saw this as an opportunity 
to develop the accounting profession and to raise its social standing. Because of the 
grounding of the SNC in a principles-based approach (as opposed to the rules-based 
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approach of the POC), the SNC demanded a much deeper knowledge of the accounting 
environment by accountants. The President noted that the SNC: 
 
… adds a new dimension to accounting: it encourages integration of the 
accountant with the reality he is accounting for, and with decisions of 
management. This results in much more active and conscious actions by 
accountants… 
 
The SNC accorded with the signification and legitimation structure of the accounting 
profession by valuing the partnership between accounting and business management.  
In the 2008 meeting between the Secretary of State for Fiscal Affairs and 
interviewee F [then President of CTOC], both were aware of the important role of this 
professional accounting body in providing the necessary supporting professional training 
to ensure the success of the SNC. Interviewee F argued that because adoption of a new 
accounting system posed so many challenges to the accounting profession, the social 
status of the profession should be raised from ‘Chamber’ to ‘Order’ – as it duly was. 
Interview F recognized that:  
 
The SNC was an opportunity to elevate the status of the profession … it 
required accountants to be better prepared and its expertise requirements … 
gave more importance to the accounting profession. 
 
The negotiation of concessions from the Government during the establishment of 
the SNC was enabled by the collaborative relationship that had developed between 
OTOC and the Government over several years, especially in connection with tax 
administration matters. 
Nonetheless, the State had fundamental control of the resources available to 
professional accounting bodies such as OTOC. The State, through a legal requirement 
of the Ministry of Finance, required all companies to have their financial statements and 
tax declarations signed by an ‘official’ accountant. The ‘official’ designation implies 
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compulsory membership of OTOC13 − and payments to OTOC for membership fees and 
professional training. This indirect resource dependence by OTOC on the Ministry of 
Finance made it unlikely that OTOC would oppose the SNC (domination perspective) – 
especially as OTOC had been consulted about its official position when the SNC was 
almost finalised. Thus, even if OTOC objected to features of the SNC and preferred to 
adapt the old accounting system in preference to IFRS (as occurred in Spain and 
France), it would be very difficult to sustain such a position. In this context, OTOC 
strived to exact concessions from the Government to achieve the same status (of 
‘Order’) of the audit profession. The Portuguese Government, who acted as a 
fundamental ally of the CNC, employed this exchange strategy. The Government 
granted the status of Order to CTOC (hence it became OTOC) in exchange for support 
in implementing the SNC. This is characteristic of institutional entrepreneurs who 
negotiate the resources they possess to impose their new institutional project. However 
we should note the view of Hardy and Maguire (2008: 210) that: 
 
… institutional entrepreneurs do not work single-handed; they engage with other 
members of the field. Institutional entrepreneurship therefore seems to be 
predominantly a collective process […] to co-opt opponents rather than to 
confront them, thereby avoiding overt conflict and resistance. 
 
OTOC fulfilled its part of the agreement by providing extensive professional 
training courses on IFRS and the SNC. The number of courses offered grew from 3 in 
2007, to 5 in 2008, 26 in 2009, and 37 in 2010.14 An important factor was that the SNC 
accounting model implied a different accounting paradigm for the accounting profession 
– one that is principles-based. This paradigm required additional professional judgment, 
high levels of disclosure, separation between accounting and taxation rules, new 
terminology, and a new way of preparing accounting information. The mandatory 
nature of OTOC’s professional training ensured it played a vital role in establishing new 
accounting practices and a new institutional logic. 
                                                 
13 This requirement was first imposed by the Decree-Law 265/1995 (which created the Association of 
Official Accountants). This was later reinforced by Decree-law 452/1999 (5 November) which approved 
the Statutes of the Chamber of Official Accountants (see also Rodrigues, Gomes and Craig, 2003). This 
Decree-law was changed by Decree-law 310/2009 (26 October) which approved the Statutes of the Order 
of Official Accountants. 
 
14 See http://www.otoc.pt, accessed on 1 March, 2011. 
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Other key players in the organizational field also supported the development of 
the SNC. OROC had supported adoption of the SNC since it was first mooted. 
However, according to the President of OROC (interviewee G): 
 
OROC has never organized any action to influence the evolution of the 
process. Nonetheless, the presence of OROC on the CNC, as well as other 
informal contacts OROC had with members of the Government, were used to 
express OROC’s opinion. During the final stage of development of the SNC 
the relation between OROC and the Ministry of Finance was very good 
because the vice-president of OROC and the Minister had been colleagues at 
the University of Porto. 
 
Interviewees I, H and J stated that their sector confederations were also in favor of the 
development of the SNC. 
In sum, new legitimating criteria (COF) were supplied by the CNC at the political 
level. Then, operating practices (POF) were disseminated by OTOC, OROC, other 
professional accounting associations, and sector confederations, through extensive 
training in the SNC. Nonetheless, interrelationships between the political and economic 
level and the organizational field level were important in establishing the final version 
of the SNC. During the due process phase in 2008, an OTOC team of experts reviewed 
the proposed version and suggested important changes. The President of OTOC 
explained that ‘… the accounting profession influenced the SNC and accounting 
regulation greatly, mainly through the document prepared by our working group. 
Almost all suggestions were accepted.’ 
Interviewee G, at the time of his participation on OTOC’s expert group, was not 
yet President of OROC. However his active membership with OTOC and OROC can 
explain that the review document proposed by both bodies bore many similarities, 
despite OROC’s proposals being  presented from an audit perspective. This added 
‘strength to the proposals’ (interviewee G). Additionally, the representative of the 
Confederation of the Portuguese Farmers (interviewee I) confirmed that two important 
paragraphs in the accounting standard relating to Agriculture (regarding measurement 
issues) were included, as suggested by his confederation, during this stage.  
Thus, during the due process phase, the documents issued by OTOC, OROC, 
other professional associations and sector confederations contained operating practices 
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for the organizational field that influenced the organizational field criteria established 
by the CNC at the economic and political level.  
 
5.3 Organizational level: Changes in signification, legitimation and domination 
structures 
Institutionalization of the SNC at an organization level implies changing the 
signification framework and legitimating grounds to accord with the legitimating 
criteria or organizational field practices of higher levels of the social context (Dillard et 
al., 2004). 
Four of the eight accountants interviewed had only small companies as clients 
(interviewees L, M, N, and Q). The remaining accountants (interviewees K, O, P and R) 
had small clients too, but they also had SMEs clients who exceeded the limits of the 
NCRF-PE. Accountants with only small clients chose to adopt the NCRF-PE standard 
for SMEs. The main reasons were that ‘… it is simpler to work with’ (interviewee M) 
and ‘it is very similar to the requirements of POC, despite more information being 
required in the notes’ (interviewee L). The accountants with the broader client list chose 
to apply the 28 standards to all of their clients. 
At the organizational level, exclusive use of the NCRF-PE by accountants with 
only small clients limited the effects of the SNC, for two main reasons. The first reason 
was the conflict between adoption of the SNC and the needs and goals of these 
accountants. As result, accountants avoided a de facto application of the new accounting 
system (Oliver, 1991). Although the transition process involved high costs (especially 
for training and software), accountants were unable to increase their service fees 
commensurately because of general economic stringencies flowing at that time from the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008. In addition, there was no broad social consensus among 
accountants concerning the merits of the new system to organizational decision-makers 
(Battilana et al., 2009; Greenwood et al., 2002; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). All 
accountants who had only small clients regarded the adoption of the SNC as not 
worthwhile for SMEs. Interviewees M and N argued that the SNC was unnecessary and 
should not be applied by SMEs. Interviewee Q contended that ‘The POC was serving 
needs perfectly.’ Interviewee M explained that: 
 
In the end [the SNC] is not worthwhile because our [small] clients companies 
do not use accounting information for decision-making and do not have a set 
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of users of their financial statements. It takes a lot of work to adapt their 
accounting system. 
 
The main users of financial statements of small firms are the State and banks. 
Consequently, the adoption of an accounting system that was oriented to a diversified 
set of users and required extensive disclosures, was considered to be inappropriate by 
these interviewees. Consistent with Oliver’s (1992) view that de-institutionalization of 
practices usually involves functional pressures, Interviewees M and N (both 
accountants) claimed that revocation of POC and adoption of the SNC would render 
accounting information less reliable and less comparable − even though the resulting 
financial statements were likely to have more information in the notes. Interviewee N 
observed that: 
 
The balance sheet and the income statement in the SNC have a much higher 
degree of summarization, so that all important information has to be in the 
notes. However, in small companies, the notes have very little information. 
Thus, in these companies, the quality of financial information will be worse 
than in the POC.15 
 
Additionally, the inclusion of the NCRF-PE in the SNC enabled accountants with 
only small companies to use a simple version of IFRS, allowing them to preserve 
existing accounting practices. This was the second major reason for the limited effect of 
the adoption of the SNC at the organizational level. Because the operations of their 
clients were very simple, these accountants were not forced to use the set of 28 
standards of the SNC. This allowed them to maintain the signification schema of the 
POC. Interviewees M and Q averred that in very small companies there were no 
significant differences between the two systems because accounting rules regarding 
current operations (such as sales, wages or purchase of goods and services) were 
identical. Interviewee N explained that ‘The major difference is the chart of accounts. 
All the rest remains the same.’ Interviewee L expanded on this by pointing to taxation 
implications: 
                                                 
15 A seemingly obvious retort would be to suggest that a remedy would be to provide expanded notes. 
However Interviewee N is drawing attention to the traditional disinclination of Portuguese accountants to 
provide expansive notes to financial statements.  
29 
 
 
Tax forms will demand thorough explanations of the options taken, which 
will increase our work. Thus, in small companies we will take the most basic 
and simple options. Accountants will limit their work to complying with tax 
obligations. 
 
The main difficulties with the SNC that were identified by interviewees L, M, N 
and Q were specific accounting issues (e.g. deferred costs, accruals) whose treatment 
under the new regulation had to be re-assessed. Another important difficulty was in how 
to value tangible assets-in-use that had been totally depreciated in the POC accounting 
system. The solution of these difficulties involved professional judgment, full 
understanding of the new conceptual framework, and dealing with fair value. These 
were all vexing matters for these accountants ─ all of whom had maintained the old 
signification schema. Thus, in accounting firms with only small company clients, the 
signification and legitimating grounds did not reflect the new legitimating criteria and 
organizational field practices of higher levels of the social context. 
With regard to the domination perspective, small accounting firms generally have 
one or two senior accountants who decide the norms and values that should prevail in 
organizational practices. Accordingly, the legitimating grounds and representational 
schemes of their firms reflected personal views of the SNC. For such accountants, the 
transition to the SNC was compulsory: it did not warrant new signification and 
legitimation structures. The allocation of resources complied merely with new legal 
requirements and OTOC’s requirements for professional training. 
As a group, accountants K, O, P, and R behaved differently. They had several 
clients above the maximum limits that allowed application of the NCRF-PE. Thus, they 
adopted the 28 standards of the SNC for all client companies. This required them to 
change accounting procedures, thereby revealing different signification and legitimating 
grounds. This was confirmed by interviewees P and K. According to interviewee P, 
‘The SNC has proved to be an opportunity to rethink several accounting problems and 
to exchange ideas with colleagues.’ Interviewee K reported that ‘The SNC … made 
employees discuss accounting and think carefully about certain issues, which was very 
useful.’ These accountants embraced the new SNC accounting system because of 
several perceived advantages. Interviewee O regarded the SNC standards to be of 
‘higher quality, help the accountant more and generate more information compared to 
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the POC.’ Interviewee P contended that there was a ‘huge change in terms of the quality 
of the information disclosed [and that] this quality depends heavily on the way the 
Notes are done.’ This group of accountants also agreed that the SNC allowed more 
decision-making autonomy (freedom of choice) than the POC. Thus, ‘it is easier for 
accountants to manipulate the accounting numbers’ (interviewee P); and ‘it is extremely 
subjective to find the assets’ fair value if they are not in liquid markets’ (interviewee R). 
Accordingly, the quality of the financial information was regarded now to be more 
dependent on the professional skills of the accountants. 
Interviewees K and O had clients in the agriculture industry. They stressed that 
the SNC provided more appropriate regulation than the old accounting system (in which 
production animals were recognized as tangible assets irrespective of their specific 
characteristics). In this case, de-institutionalization of the former practices occurred 
because the POC was inadequate for some of their clients, particularly those in 
agriculture. Changes in the accounting law prohibited perpetuation of institutionalized 
practices of the POC (Oliver, 1992) forcing the accountants to apply the 28 standards. 
These combined events prompted new signification and legitimation structures that 
were supported by resource allocations beyond compulsory training (e.g., interviewee K 
hired a person to assist with conversion to the SNC, interviewee P paid for all 
employees to receive additional training in the requirements of the SNC). 
Two different pressures operated at that level. The first was the pressure applied 
by the State through the imposition of the SNC and its associated enforcement measures 
(fines between €500 and €1,500). The State was also influential regarding the date 
companies converted to the SNC because of the fiscal obligations it imposed for 2010 
(Value Added Tax declarations). The second pressure was exerted by clients.  
In respect of his preparedness to adopt the SNC, interviewee K noted: 
 
I have important responsibilities towards my clients, so I had to be prepared. 
Small companies did not notice the change of accounting system. But larger 
companies did. It was important that all went well for them to keep their trust 
in my work. 
 
Even though most clients were unaware that a new accounting system had been 
adopted, all accountants felt they could not abandon clients’ expectations of quality 
accounting services, regardless the accounting system in force. Interviewee K stated that 
31 
 
‘Even when our competitors have lower prices, clients do not change if the relationship 
with their accountant is good.’ 
All accountants interviewed agreed that their relationship with clients was stable 
and based on trust. However, to fulfill expectations, a limited application of the SNC 
was sufficient for some accountants. This is consistent with D’Aunno et al.’s (1991) 
argument that organizations rank new practices in terms of a hierarchy of unequally 
important institutional demands. Accordingly, Portuguese accountants changed their 
accounting practices to the extent necessary. They did so to maintain their legitimacy, in 
line with their assessment of the institutional demands placed on them by the State, 
banks and clients. 
The intensive professional training all accountants were required to undertake 
legitimated a new cognitive base and promulgated new rules of professional behavior. 
For all accountants interviewed, talking with other colleagues (to clarify specific doubts 
during the adoption of the SNC) was an important part of their preparedness ─ it 
complemented their professional training.  
 
6. Discussion 
Our results validate the capacity of the Dillard et al. model to explain the top-
down de-institutionalization of the POC and the adoption of the SNC. They confirm the 
usefulness of combining concepts of institutional entrepreneurship with the Dillard et 
al. model to explain the process of change in the Portuguese accounting system.  
We reveal that the CNC, a central actor in its field, was an important institutional 
entrepreneur. The CNC initiated the SNC project and participated actively in its 
implementation by theorizing the process of change, harnessing political support, and 
mobilizing allies (Battilana et al., 2009; Rao and Giorgi, 2006). However, the CNC was 
not a dis-embedded ‘heroic’ institutional entrepreneur (a criticism made in recent 
studies of institutional entrepreneurship by Battilana et al., 2009; Lounsbury and 
Crumley, 2007; and Maguire et al., 2004). Instead, a confluence of events enabled the 
creation and development of the SNC and facilitated the entrepreneurial actions of the 
CNC. 
At the PE level, IFRS gradually became the legitimating structure within the EU. 
On-going resource allocations reinforced these new accounting rules. However, we 
should recognize that when organizations are faced with identical contexts they may 
perceive them differently (Dillard et al., 2004). This is because organizations differ in 
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terms of their strategies and abilities; signification, legitimating and domination 
structures; and the extent to which institutional practices are embedded within them. 
Indeed, responses of member-states to the change in signification, legitimation and 
domination structures in the EU were diverse: some maintained their accounting 
regulation but incorporated in them adapted IFRS standards (e.g. Spain and France); 
and others replaced their accounting system with a new set of accounting rules similar 
to IFRS (e.g., Portugal).  
Regulatory changes in the EU, initiated after 1995, introduced new accounting 
criteria (CPE) based on IFRS. These provided the context for developing a new 
accounting system (COF) in Portugal, consistent with Dillard et al. (2004). These 
regulatory changes disturbed the consensus within the accounting field in continental 
countries by increasing actors’ awareness of an alternative accounting logic (Guerreiro 
et al., 2012; Seo and Creed, 2002). This important field condition triggered the 
entrepreneurial action of the CNC. The rise of IFRS in the EU highlighted the 
inefficiency of Portugal’s accounting system, despite its long evolution. This motivated 
the CNC to solve this problem in the accounting field. It provided the CNC with the 
opportunity to construct rationales for change (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Seo and 
Creed, 2002). 
Several members of the Executive Committee of the CNC were aware of IFRS 
logic by virtue of their work experiences with multinational and listed companies. 
Embeddedness of actors in multiple fields provides alternative logics of action that 
affects the way actors interpret, evaluate and respond (Hardy and Maguire, 2008; 
Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Since these actors were more aware of other models of 
action regarding accounting practices, they were less likely to prefer the prevailing 
institutional arrangement (the POC accounting system) (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 
2005; Seo and Creed, 2002). Thus, they were more willing to support the development 
of an accounting system based on IFRS.  
The embeddedness of several members of the Executive Committee in multiple 
fields enabled knowledge to be transmitted inside the professional network of official 
auditors ─ and, in turn, for this to be reflected in their position at the CNC. This helped 
develop awareness of the international accounting harmonization process – something 
that was fundamental to the formulation of the SNC.  
Implementation of the change was fostered by claims by listed companies about 
the costs and difficulties of the dual accounting they were obliged to undertake. These 
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claims were more prominent among official auditors who dealt with multinational 
companies and subsidiaries of listed companies. Eventually, as this problem became 
socially recognized, field-level negotiations ensued (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007). 
The CNC found political support for the SNC from the Minister of Finance. As a former 
stock exchange regulator, the Minister was disposed to support the SNC. He was the 
ideal receptor of complaints by listed companies about the high costs of dual 
accounting. The minister’s multiple embeddedness based on his work experience in 
financial markets (which embrace IFRS as the dominant institutional logic) guided his 
decision-making and it was very influential in enabling implementation of the new 
accounting system (based on IFRS) (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005). Accordingly, the 
Minister of Finance was an important ally of the CNC. The CNC also invoked the 
power and formal authority of the State to support the implementation of the SNC. 
Thus, this study is consistent with several prior studies of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Boxenbaum 
and Battilana, 2005) in confirming that actors’ awareness of other fields, and their 
recourse to diverse institutional logics, are crucial in understanding the emergence of 
entrepreneurship.  
It is unlikely that entrepreneurial outcomes will be embraced easily by actors who 
are committed to existing institutional arrangements (Garud et al., 2007). Consequently, 
implementation of divergent change involves mobilizing and motivating the social 
groups involved and creating ‘a vision for divergent change’ (Battilana et al., 2009) 
through a theorization process. This is even more critical in highly structured fields, 
where templates of appropriate organizational behavior are established (Greenwood et 
al., 2002). Change is often resisted because it threatens actors’ sense of security and 
their established organizational privileges, increases the cost of information processing, 
and disrupts routines (DiMaggio, 1988; Powell, 1991). Both the CNC and the 
Portuguese Government were alert to the importance of attaining the consensus of 
interested parties about the new accounting standards in order to enhance future 
compliance levels. Accordingly, during 2007 and 2008, the CNC made the problems of 
the old accounting system explicit. The CNC theorized about the ways in which the 
SNC would resonate with the interests and problems of companies (Boxenbaum, 2006; 
Greenwood et al., 2002).  
Furthermore, success of institutional change depends on the elements of 
continuity between the old and the new institutional project that are emphasized by 
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institutional entrepreneurs; and on the ties they are able to create with their multiple 
audiences (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007). Through the inclusion of a specific standard 
for SMEs in the SNC, the Government sought resonance with the interests and values of 
small companies. Nonetheless, the Government’s choice was influenced also by 
political criteria of the EU that sought reductions in administrative costs.  
This attempt to ‘create a vision’ about implementing the new accounting system 
was followed by the ‘mobilization of allies’ (Battilana et al., 2009; Greenwood et al., 
2002; Lawrence et al., 2002). As is usual, entrepreneurial strategies employed by 
powerful actors operated through exchange mechanisms and the establishment of 
collaborative relations (Hardy and Maguire, 2008). The outcome was that other 
resources were mobilized to support implementation of the SNC: the Portuguese 
Government mobilized an important ally by cultivating an alliance with OTOC. This 
alliance made it easier for the main professional body (OTOC) to accept the new 
system, thereby helping to strengthen and legitimize adoption of the SNC. Because 
OTOC also possessed formal authority, this coalition also leveraged the importance of 
formal authority that was implicit in the process (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).16 
The recursive process of Dillard et al. (2004) incorporates changes upwards as a 
process in which taken-for-granted norms, values and beliefs are revised continually at 
all levels. Our findings reveal how the Portuguese Government responded to the need to 
reduce the impact of adopting a complex new accounting system. Pressures and 
complaints at the organizational field level encouraged the Portuguese Government to 
accept that more companies should be able to use simplified accounting systems; and 
that changes to the limits for use of the SME standard were necessary. OTOC and 
OROC played an active role in changing the relevant limits. This points to the important 
role that the interests of agents in the organizational field can play in establishing laws 
and regulations at the political and economic level.  
Professional accounting associations were influential at the organizational field 
level (as Dillard et al., 2004, predicted). They were also influential primary agents at the 
political and economic level. Nonetheless, our study reveals that these interests were not 
homogeneous among organizational field actors. Accounting organizations and sector 
                                                 
16 The Big-four companies were not influential in this process at the political level. Interviewee C noted 
that multinational audit companies do not influence the activity of accounting boards at a national level 
because they influence the IASB directly. Their influence at a higher level is consistent with Suddaby et 
al.’s (2007) argument that representation of the Big-four on the IASB board, and the importance of Big-
four donations to the IASB, means that these firms occupy a strategic structural position in shaping 
accounting regulation. 
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confederations had contradictory opinions about the inclusion of the NCRF-PE in the 
SNC. This is consistent with recent theoretical views of the concept of organizational 
field that replace assumptions of uniformity, isomorphic actors, and a central coherent 
set of beliefs, with relational spaces where contending logics are a force for institutional 
change (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008). Regarding the inclusion of the NCRF-PE in the 
SNC, the influence of the organizational field at the political and economic level was 
not homogeneous because of the different interests and motivations of organizational 
field actors. Eventually, this weakened the influence of the organizational field at the 
political level, allowing the Portuguese Government to make decisions based primarily 
on the EU context. 
The Dillard et al. model predicts a top-down institutionalization process in which 
operating practices (POF) at the organizational field level are a function of organizational 
field criteria (COF). The latter, in turn, are a function of societal level criteria (CPE). In 
the Portuguese case, organizational field practices were considered in establishing the 
new accounting system. This occurred through the membership on the CNC of OTOC, 
OROC and sector confederations, and participation of these bodies in due process 
proceedings. Operating practices of the organizational field influenced the document 
issued by OTOC, OROC and sector confederations. In turn, this influenced the 
organizational field criteria (the SNC) established at the economic and political level 
also. The Dillard et al. model does not address an earlier reversion of the cascading 
institutionalization process explicitly, even though the model allows such possibility.  
Our results highlight that change processes are not initiated only at the 
organizational level by knowledgeable, reflexive agents and by conflicting criteria 
between societal and organizational values and society norms. Change can occur also in 
earlier stages when legitimate practices of agents, acting in the organizational field, 
need to be better accommodated in newly established legitimating criteria. 
At the organizational field level, the SNC concurred with the prevailing 
representational schema of the accounting profession in the way ideas, interpretations 
and meanings are framed and the role they play in legitimating social action (Dillard et 
al., 2004). The new accounting system accentuated the signification schema of OTOC 
by valuing the integration of accounting practices with business management practices. 
The SNC reinforced the professional criterion of ‘usefulness of accounting information’ 
and the professional expectation that there should be a partnership between accounting 
and business management. Additionally, the new accounting system strengthened the 
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importance of the accounting profession by requiring a more conscientious practice of 
accounting – one involving a principles-based approach. These conditions favored the 
acceptance of the SNC by OTOC, the major accounting association. 
Our analysis reveals that changes at the organizational field level were influenced 
by interests and agency; and that changes developed as a consequence of the dual forces 
of agency and structure (Beckert, 1999; Dillard et al., 2004). The President of OTOC 
believed that the interests and needs of the accounting profession were served poorly by 
the existing social status (Seo and Creed, 2002), especially when compared to the social 
status of the audit profession. Variation in the characteristics of different institutional 
arrangements within the accounting profession (Order versus Chamber) was an enabling 
condition for the expression of latent interests of agents (transformational agency) 
(Battilana et al., 2009; Seo and Creed, 2002). This enabled the President of OTOC to 
seek an elevation in the status of the accounting profession to ‘Order’. This concession 
by the Government was compensated through the extensive professional training OTOC 
provided, so that legitimate operating practices would spread at the field level (POF). 
The interests of OROC were also accommodated in the establishment of the SNC, 
mainly by the change made to the limits of the NCRF-PE. 
At the organizational level, the SNC was adopted in two different ways. First, it 
was adopted by accountants with only small company clients who chose to use the 
NCRF-PE exclusively; and second, it was adopted by accountants with a heterogeneous 
set of clients (small, medium and large SMEs) who chose to adopt the 28 standards. For 
the first type, there has been a limited application of the SNC. The benefits of the SNC 
to the accounting profession that motivated the President of OTOC to embrace the new 
accounting system were not perceived as accruing to accounting firms with only small 
clients. Because of the client characteristics of these accounting firms (especially in 
using accounting mainly for tax purposes), the claimed advantages of the SNC were not 
experienced. Rather, the SNC was perceived to require excessive transition costs and an 
undue level of effort for a reduced number of financial statement users.  
Organizational field practices (POF) can be translated at the organizational level 
into working practices and be enacted subsequently at the intra-organizational level 
(Hopper and Major, 2007). If these practices reinforce interests and beliefs of agents at 
this level, they are institutionalized. However, if contradictions occur, resistance to the 
institutionalization of the imposed practice is expected (and organizations exert pressure 
to change eventually) (Cruz et al., 2009). In the present case, at the organizational level, 
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accounting firms with only small clients experienced two important institutional 
contradictions. There was an increase in the efficiency gap between the structure being 
adopted and their routines and practices grounded in the old accounting system. 
Additionally, there was a misalignment between features of the SNC (that ultimately 
reflected the goals and needs of multinational corporations and capital markets) and the 
interests and needs of the clients of these accounting firms. Even though these 
accountants applied the specific standard for SMEs, they were conscious of the 
institutional conditions that led to adoption of the new accounting system. Indeed, the 
increase in the initial application limits reveals how Portuguese companies were able to 
change the legitimacy criteria being imposed on them (consistent with Seo and Creed, 
2002). These contradictions delayed enactment of the imposed practices and hindered 
de facto application of the new rules. 
Resistance to new accounting rules and routines can be manifest in ceremonial use 
of accounting (Burns and Scapens, 2000). As a result, loose coupling of accounting 
neutralizes the impact of accounting change and leads to institutional stability (Nor-
Aziah and Scapens, 2007). The change in the chart of accounts was one of the most 
important changes for these accountants. By keeping existing arrangements separate, 
independent and unaffected by the SNC (that is, loose coupled), actual operations were 
unaffected by the implementation of accounting change. Thus, a degree of stability was 
maintained. 
The fact that accountants with a heterogeneous client list responded differently 
reveals that the 28 standards of the SNC were capable of being well accepted when 
institutional contradictions are smaller ─ and when accountants share a view of the 
accounting profession similar to that of the President of OTOC. At the organizational 
level, these explanations are consistent with a conceptualization of organizational 
behavior that addresses internal organizational dynamics and embraces translation of 
new practices (Hopper and Major, 2007). Resistance can arise when the interests and 
needs of agents are contradicted by imposed practices. When they are not contradicted, 
institutionalization occurs. The accountants with heterogeneous client lists are now 
operating in a new societal context where legitimating structures require implementation 
of a principles-based accounting system and a deeper application of the concept of 
utility of financial information. These accountants acknowledged the need for 
accounting to be timelier, value-relevant and less conservative. They regarded the 
adoption of the SNC as an opportunity to rethink important accounting concepts. 
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Adoption implied changing their signification schema and legitimating grounds. Such 
conceptualization is particularly useful in a context of adopting compulsory practice. It 
provides better understanding of organizational behavior than the two-stage diffusion 
process (innovators versus late adopters) described by Dillard et al. (2004). 
 
7. Conclusions 
Examination of the implementation of a new IFRS-based accounting system in a 
code-law country using the Dillard et al. (2004) model of institutional change and 
institutional entrepreneurship theory has revealed how the process of accounting change 
was enabled by the actions of multiple actors coalescing to support an institutional 
project. The CNC’s entrepreneurial actions fostered the implementation of the SNC in a 
fashion that was generally consistent with the Dillard et al. (2004) model. 
The results yield clarifying and expanded explanations of the Dillard et al. model, 
particularly in respect of how and why (entrepreneurial) actors engage in reflexive, 
knowledgeable human action within existing structures. They reveal the capacity of 
agents at the organizational field level to counteract the institutionalization process 
before it reaches the organizational level.  
 
This examination of how the Portuguese accounting change process was enacted 
at the political and economic level reveals that regulatory changes within the EU 
disrupted professional consensus on code-law traditions. When allied with the 
embeddedness of important actors in multiple fields, this enabled the CNC to act as an 
institutional entrepreneur. Consciousness of alternative logics of action made the 
dominance of existing institutional arrangements no longer an inevitability. However, 
the creation of a new institutional arrangement needed to resonate with existing interests 
and with societal belief systems in order to mobilize resources and support (Seo and 
Creed, 2002). Institutional entrepreneurs used their political and social skills to promote 
collaborative relations (for example, between the CNC and the Portuguese Government 
and between the Portuguese Government and OTOC) to induce actors in the 
organizational field to co-operate with the change process. This is consistent with the 
view that ‘institutional entrepreneurship seems to be predominantly a collective 
process’ (Hardy and Maguire, 2008: 209). Nonetheless, social, economic and political 
criteria set the parameters for establishing the organizational field criteria and the limits 
within which institutional entrepreneurship occurred (Battilana et al., 2009; Dillard et 
al., 2004; Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005). 
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We have highlighted two ways whereby accounting organizations and sector 
confederations can be primary agents at the political and economic level: first, through 
their influence on the content of accounting regulation during the due process phase; 
and second, through the establishment of quantitative limits for the application of SME 
standards. 
Inversion of the cascading institutional process is not necessarily a consequence 
of changes motivated by agents at the organizational level, as described explicitly by 
Dillard et al. (2004). Accordingly, in the ‘due process’ phase of establishing accounting 
standards, operating practices that are considered legitimate at the organizational field 
level are present in the positions taken by accounting organizations and other organized 
parties. They thereby influence regulations enacted at the political and economic level.  
Additionally, in the accounting standard-setting context, the influential role of 
some actors at different levels occurs because of their involvement in all three levels of 
the Dillard et al. model. Accountants and accounting firms (the organizational level) are 
represented by OTOC (at the organizational field level), and this organization has 
representatives at the CNC (political level). This model of representativeness occurs in 
most countries in the accounting field, facilitating the inter-level dynamics proposed by 
Dillard et al. (2004), and explaining why pressures can move upwards and downwards 
in the societal system. Consequently, the expanded explanations we offer of the Dillard 
et al. model at the organizational field level reinforce the applicability of that model in 
the accounting domain. 
Finally, we confirm that institutional influence at the organizational field level can 
spread in all directions (including upwards) through pressures on legislators. The 
actions of OTOC and OROC illustrate how their interests were accommodated by the 
change to the limits of application of the SME standard that were established at the 
political and economic level. 
At the organizational level, accountants attempted to combine old representational 
schema with new legitimating criteria to resolve clashes between their interests and their 
needs. The loose coupled application of the Portuguese SME accounting standard 
confirmed that it was perceived to be easier to change accounting standards than to 
change the representational schemas accountants used to frame organizational reality. 
Our results complement previous analyses (using institutional lenses) of the 
adoption of IFRS by nation states (Irvine, 2008; Mir and Rahaman, 2005). We reveal 
that institutionalization of new accounting practices depends on factors other than a 
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coordinated structure that accommodates interests of the parties involved or that adapts 
IFRS to the needs of different users. Institutionalization of the change process initiated 
at the political level by the Portuguese accounting standards setting body involved 
taking advantage of political opportunity, mobilizing important allies, negotiating social 
positions, and accommodating the interests of major protagonists in the accounting 
field. Additionally, accounting concepts transferred from the previous system prevailed 
among accountants with only small clients ─ they adopted the SME standard. It was 
easier for them to change accounting standards than to change the signification schemas 
of accountants who framed the organizational reality they accounted for. The full 
adoption of the SNC standards favored tight coupling and de facto application of 
principles-based accounting standards (consistent with the purposes of the SNC) − as 
well as changing signification and legitimation structures at the organizational level. 
Because small companies usually do not have their own accountant, the SME standard 
helped small accounting firms make the transition to IFRS easily. Full adoption of IFRS 
by all companies, and by all accountants, would have demanded a greater preparation 
effort during the transition period. However, this would have facilitated changes in 
signification and legitimation structures at the organizational level and more consistent 
adoption of these standards. 
We are wary not to generalize findings based on a single case. However, when it 
is possible to relate research results to theoretical propositions (as here) those results 
have a broader significance (Moll et al., 2006). Because institutionalization is a 
longitudinal process (Scott, 2001), assimilation of the new accounting standards will 
take time. Further qualitative studies could improve understanding of the 
institutionalization process of the SNC by analyzing the adoption of the 28 standards by 
large companies (which were not included in this study) or by exploring how 
legitimation and signification structures of small accounting firms have evolved. 
Additionally, further studies should seek to understand whether institutional 
entrepreneurship ends once new accounting systems are established or whether 
entrepreneurial actions are undertaken afterwards. Also, the approach used here can be 
replicated to study the institutionalization of new accounting systems in other countries. 
This would allow comparisons of institutional dynamics among different nation states. 
Such studies would help refine the Dillard et al. model further by providing a deeper 
understanding of the processes that articulate criteria and practices over the three levels 
of a variety of societal systems. 
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Table 1. Interviewee Details  
 
Position Interviewee Duration 
(minutes) 
President, CNC A 90 
Member of the Executive Commission, CNC B 90 
Member of the Executive Commission, CNC C 90 
President of the Executive Commission, CNC D 90 
Representative of CNC on the ARC E 60 
President, OTOC F 120 
President, OROC G 90 
Representative of the Confederation of Commerce and Services of Portugal H 45 
Representative of the Confederation of Portuguese Farmers I 90 
Representative of the Confederation of Manufacturing of Portugal J 45 
Partner of an accounting firm. 80 clients (turnover < €30,000,000) in all sectors. 
Some clients are in agriculture, but most are in the commercial sector. A 
teacher in higher education. Age 49. 
K 45 
Partner of an accounting firm. 22 clients (turnover < €500,000) in the services 
sector, except for one client in the construction sector. Age 36. 
L 45 
Partner of an accounting firm. 40 clients (turnover < €300,000) in the textile and 
services industries. A trainee in a firm of official auditors. Age 34. 
M 45 
Partner of an accounting firm. 38 clients (turnover < €1,000,000) in the services 
sector exclusively. Age 68. 
N 45 
Partner of an accounting firm. 70 clients (turnover < €10,000,000) in the textile, 
agriculture, commerce and services industries. Age 64. 
O 60 
Partner of an accounting firm. 80 clients (turnover < €20,000,000) in the textile, 
footwear, hotels, culture sectors. Age 37. 
P 45 
Accountant of a SME trading in construction materials (turnover €2,000,000). Age 
57. 
Q 60 
Accountant of several SMEs. 6 clients (turnover < €15,000,000) in the textile, food 
and stationery commerce. Age 72. 
R 45 
Total 18  
 
 
